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Asylum as a Moral Panic
In his introduction to the third edition of Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 
Stanley Cohen (2002: vii–xxvi) gives fresh examples of ‘moral panics’ that 
arose in the 30 years following the first appearance of his book; one of these 
examples concerns refugees and asylum seekers. He characterises such panics 
as focused on issues that are actually new forms of older worries and con-
cerns, and in these terms the ‘asylum panic’ is understood as a particular 
manifestation of a long-running, perhaps immemorial, fear of strangers or 
outsiders (Simmel 1976). Indeed, the policy approaches of European gov-
ernments display both of the classic responses to outsiders identified by 
Zygmunt Bauman (1997). ‘Anthropophagy’—‘devouring’ strangers and 
‘metabolically transforming them into a tissue indistinguishable from one’s 
own’ (ibid.: 18)—is evident in the long running penchant for ‘assimilation-
ist’ strategies towards immigration in various European countries (Vertovec 
and Wessendorf 2010). At the same time ‘anthropoemy’—‘vomiting’ out 
strangers and ‘banishing them from the limits of the orderly world’ (Bauman 
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1997: 18)—has been vividly exemplified in recent years by the erection of 
new barriers. Hungary, for example, faced with the receipt of significantly 
more first-time asylum applications in the first half of 2015 than in previous 
years, famously constructed a wire fence along its 175-kilometer border with 
Serbia in order to deter new entries (Migration Policy Centre 2016), result-
ing in the onward migration of thousands of rejected would-be immigrants.
Cohen (2002) suggests, however, that the moral panic surrounding asy-
lum is ‘crucially different’ (ibid.: xxiii) from his other examples of moral 
panics, including those surrounding benefit cheats, paedophiles and high 
school massacres. Rather than being focused on ‘specific newsworthy epi-
sodes’ (Cohen 2002: xxiii), the moral panic about asylum seekers has been 
long drawn-out, characterised by a ‘virtually uninterrupted message of hos-
tility and rejection’ (ibid.: xxii). Asylum is a rare example of a moral panic 
that is chronic rather than acute in nature. Tyler (2013) dates the more or 
less continuous moral panic about Britain as a ‘soft touch’ for criminals and 
bogus refugees to the early 1990s. Similarly, talk of ‘crisis’ in France dates 
back to at least the mid-1980s, when annual numbers of asylum claims tre-
bled within a few years (Legoux 1995: xxiii).
Cohen also argues that the moral panic surrounding asylum is ‘more 
overtly political than any others’ (Cohen 2002: xxiii). For example, although 
the 1951 Refugee Convention is a recognition of the special moral claims 
of refugees, as persons suffering persecution because of their beliefs or eth-
nicity, the political purpose of the Convention has altered significantly since 
its inception. Despite the popular impression that it safeguards refugees, 
its continued observance is a paradoxical confirmation of the legitimacy of 
immigration controls more generally in modern liberal democracies.
Furthermore, the asylum issue is deeply contested as a result of an inher-
ent contradiction between the need for Western states to portray themselves 
as representing shared communities with common values, including recog-
nition of basic human rights such as the right not to suffer persecution; and 
the discretionary right assumed by modern states to decide who can enter 
and reside in their territory. This tension accounts for what Gibney (2014) 
terms the ‘schizophrenic response’ (n.p.) of European states, whereby they 
‘continue to embrace asylum but spurn the asylum seeker’ (n.p.) and offer 
protection only grudgingly. It has also resulted in the occasional eruption of 
pro-asylum voices from various quarters over the last two decades, and espe-
cially since the summer of 2015, which gives the asylum issue a particularly 
disputed feel (see Conlon and Gill 2015).
This contestation relates to what Goodwin-Gill conceptualises as two 
competing models for approaching refugee issues: a model that focuses on 
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the need to treat every individual asylum applicant on their own merits; and 
an instrumental security model that emphasises control of refugees on the 
basis of the balance between the perceived risks they pose and the oppor-
tunities they offer to receiving countries (2001: 14–15). This book is full 
of examples wherein particular administrative and legal systems display one, 
and sometimes both, of these tendencies.
The Asylum System ‘in Crisis’
One manifestation of this schizophrenia is the repeated invocation of the 
trope of ‘crisis’ in relation to asylum. Thus, the ‘refugee crisis’ that domi-
nated European political attention in 2015–2016—provoked largely by 
the unusually large numbers of people entering Europe in flight from the 
Syrian conflict—was a particularly intense form of the moral panic that has 
surrounded the questions of asylum and immigration more generally over 
the last few decades. This ‘crisis’ is commonly portrayed, by politicians and 
in the media, using either fluvial or animal metaphors, such as likening the 
arrival of asylum seekers to a ‘flood’, ‘tide’, ‘torrent’ or ‘wave’ that threatens 
to ‘swamp’ the recipient society (Charteris-Black 2006: 570–572), or alter-
natively likening it to a ‘stampede, ‘flock’ or ‘swarm’ of arrivals with a sim-
ilar potential to overwhelm receiving countries. Both types of metaphor are 
clearly dehumanising, but they also both employ a rhetorical ruse in relation 
to the notion of disaster. On the one hand, immigration itself is represented 
as a ‘natural’ disaster (Charteris-Black 2006). This view implicitly relieves 
liberal democracies of their own responsibilities for the immigration pres-
sures they experience: responsibilities rooted in the often invisible ‘systemic 
violence’ (Žižek 2009: 8) of global capitalism, historical exploitation, une-
qual trading relationships and neo-colonialism of which they are a part. On 
the other hand, immigration systems are portrayed as the disaster: bureau-
crats are typically portrayed as inept and inadequate to the task of respond-
ing effectively to the challenges migration poses.
This elision of asylum as crisis—whereby asylum seekers are seen as cultural, 
economic, or security threats; and asylum in crisis—whereby the administra-
tive systems for controlling the numbers of applicants, deciding on the validity 
of their claims, and deporting those whose claims are deemed to be false, are 
seen as inadequate—‘serves as an important mechanism in the reproduction 
of dominant asylum discourse’ (Moore 2010: 145). Specifically, it affords the 
opportunity to project the supposed disaster of migration onto an evidently 
disastrous administration. This slippage is extremely expedient politically 
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because it provides a particularly direct way for sensationalist media and oppo-
sition parties to portray the ‘crisis’ as stemming from the incompetence of pol-
iticians. The obvious subtext is that the challenging political party will provide 
a more competent administration by being more efficient and, typically, more 
exclusionary. Over time this configuration of ‘crisis’, political critique and pol-
icy response results in an inexorable ratchetting up of immigration controls 
as power either swaps hands between parties who make increasingly bold and 
ambitious promises about control whilst in opposition, or as incumbent par-
ties become more exclusionary in order to hold on to power.
This discourse of crisis can also be linked to distrust, political alienation 
and the rise of the political right in Europe in recent years (see New York 
Times 2017). Paying attention to why large sections of liberal society have 
turned towards right-wing, immigration-restricting parties in recent years 
is crucially important for understanding the development of immigration 
and asylum law. Working class, low skilled voters in many Western econo-
mies are facing unemployment, falling real wages, rising personal debt and 
a mismatch between their own skills and those required by largely tertiary 
and quaternary industrial economies. The rise of right wing populism in 
the United States and Britain, for example, has been driven by structural 
changes in their economies that have rendered this social group disillusioned 
and feeling politically unrepresented (Ford and Goodwin 2014). Similarly 
in much of continental Europe, the economic difficulties of the late 2000s, 
including the sovereign debt crisis that erupted at the end of 2009, pro-
duced rising unemployment levels, fuelling right wing sentiments and 
increasing pressure on politicians to restrict numbers of immigrants, includ-
ing asylum seekers and refugees (Greven 2016). Although radical right–wing 
parties are once again ‘a force to be reckoned with’ (Akkerman et al. 2016: 
3), the most notable feature of the right-wing parties that have benefitted 
from these developments is their strengthened mainstream appeal; policies 
and rhetoric that might once have been considered radically right-wing are 
becoming more acceptable and politically potent.
The issue of refugee migration to Europe played a part in the United 
Kingdom Independence Party’s (UKIP) successful campaign for Britain to 
vote to leave the EU in 2016 for instance, which involved poster images 
of refugees making their way on foot across the Balkans alongside the cap-
tion ‘Breaking Point: The EU has Failed us all’, a tactic which opponents 
interpreted as ‘exploiting the misery of the Syrian refugee crisis in the most 
dishonest and immoral way’.1 Moreover, those governments that welcomed 
1Yvette Cooper, British Member of Parliament, quoted in The Huffington Post (Hopkins 2016).
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the most refugees in 2015, such as Germany and Sweden, have faced harsh 
criticism from sections of their electorates in the following years as racial 
tensions, poverty among incumbent populations and the fear of terrorism 
nurtured a backlash of anti-refugee sentiment. In consequence, attention 
has gradually turned towards measures to contain refugee flows in Turkey or 
other locations closer to the source of the migratory movements.
As in many other contexts the term ‘crisis’, which was ‘once a signifier 
for a critical decisive moment’, has ‘come to be construed as a protracted 
historical and experiental condition’ (Roitman 2013: 2; see also Agamben 
2005). Its widespread use, says Roitman, subordinates particular events, 
in all their singularity and uniqueness, to a ‘generic logic’ that seems ‘self- 
explanatory’ (2013: 3). Its use also inevitably entails explicit or implicit 
judgments about what a normal state of affairs would look like: ‘crisis com-
pared to what?’ (ibid.: 4). In the case of asylum in Western Europe this may 
be the situation at the height of the Cold War, when asylum seekers came 
mostly from the Soviet Bloc and ‘each one constituted a vote for the political 
system of the West and a reproach to that of the East’ (Schuster 2003: 190). 
Consequently almost all such refugees were granted asylum with very little 
individual scrutiny, reinforcing the presumption that they must, therefore, 
‘have been authentic refugees fleeing authentic persecution’ (Legoux 1995: 
xxiii). Use of crisis discourse also, importantly, legitimates and supports the 
redistribution and extension of state power (Strasser 2016: 48; Klein 2007; 
Mountz and Heimstra 2014), allowing the adoption of measures of govern-
ance that would otherwise seem excessively authoritarian (Buzan et al. 1998: 
21–23).
In the Cold War period security threats were commonly presented as 
political or military in character, and the entity posing the threat was a state 
or some supra-national grouping like ‘the Soviet Bloc’. The focus was on 
material factors such as the scale of a state’s military capacity. More recently, 
however, it has become common to identify threats in economic, environ-
mental and health-related contexts too as part of a pandemic of anxieties 
that seem to accompany modern everyday life (Furedi 2002; Pain and Smith 
2008; Beck 1992). Popular understanding of the consequences of migration 
is an important form of this heightened sense of social fear. Furthermore, 
when a strong state response is seen as the antidote to the fearful con-
dition in question, it becomes in the interests of state bureaucrats, as well 
as their contracted agencies, to confirm and reproduce the sense of unease 
that provokes an appeal to them (Bigo 2002; see also Isin 2004). From this 
perspective the increasingly common tendency among politicians to iden-
tify refugees and migrants as, on the one hand, threats to the ‘culture’ or 
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‘identity’ of the indigenous population and, on the other, as posing criminal 
or terrorist threats to citizens’ personal safety and security, is unsurprising 
(Huysmans 2000: 751).
The constructivist approach to securitisation pioneered by the 
Copenhagen School of Security Studies foregrounds the performative 
aspects of security discourse. Buzan et al. define securitisation as a perlocu-
tionary ‘speech act’—whereby some particular issue is ‘presented as an exis-
tential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside 
the normal bounds of political procedure’ (1998: 23–24)—that is accepted 
as valid by its target audience. In other words, securitisation is the inter-sub-
jective process whereby a phenomenon like migration becomes a security 
issue, not because it necessarily poses an actual or significant threat, but 
because it is successfully presented as doing so.
During the post Cold War era of the 1990s and early 2000s, immigra-
tion was one area wherein securitisation ‘opened up a number of discursive 
opportunities to correlate terrorism with immigration, thereby helping to 
legitimise practices and technologies in migration control that were usually 
reserved for emergencies’ (Boswell 2007: 589; see Buzan et al. 1998: 23–26; 
Huysmans 2000). Here it is helpful to distinguish analytically between secu-
ritisation as framed in political discourse and securitisation as manifest in 
administrative action (Boswell 2007: 591). Unlike in the United States, 
it is at this latter level in particular, argues Boswell, that securitisation has 
been most apparent in Europe. Furthermore, rather than counter-terrorism 
practices having been incorporated into practices of migration control, the 
process has been rather the reverse, namely that tools developed in further-
ance of migration policy, such as databases on foreign nationals, airline pas-
senger lists, and frontier passport controls, ‘have been harnessed in order to 
enhance the surveillance of suspected or potential terrorists’ (2007: 601).
In short, for all the reasons identified above, national and supra-national 
legal and administrative structures for processing and assessing asylum 
claims, and controlling or deporting those who make them, have been 
portrayed on the one hand as increasingly important to the economic 
and social well-being, and even the physical safety, of citizens; and on the 
other, as grossly inadequate and inefficient, and in urgent need of root and 
branch reform. In such circumstances it is remarkable that so little empirical 
research has been carried out into how these structures actually operate in 
practice. The great bulk of the research that has been done on administrative 
and legal systems of asylum determination falls under the heading of legal 
studies rather than social science and is thus primarily normative rather than 
critical in its stance. The present volume seeks to help remedy these lacunae.
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The ‘Refugee Crisis’ in Perspective
The crisis rhetoric surrounding asylum seeking in Europe was exacerbated by 
the civil war in Syria, compounded by the human rights abuses perpetrated 
by the self-styled Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq. These had resulted in 
the deaths of over 250,000 people by mid-2015 (BBC 2016) and produced 
one of the largest human migration events in history. Around 11 million 
people were forced to leave their homes and seek safety between the begin-
ning of the civil war in March 2011 and mid-2016 (www.syrianrefugees.eu 
2016). It is well known that attempts to reach Europe often end in tragedy, 
underscoring the lengths to which migrants have been forced to go to find 
safety. 3700 people lost their lives in the Mediterranean in 2015, and over 
4900 died in the same way in 2016 (IOM 2016). The risk of dying along 
this route was estimated at one in 269 arrivals in 2015 and one in 88 (one 
in 47 between Libya and Italy) in 2016 as migrants turned to more perilous 
routes and smugglers resorted to more dangerous tactics in an attempt to 
avoid heightened border controls (UNHCR 2016a).
Yet for all the crisis talk about refugees in Europe, it is notable that the 
vast majority of Syrians affected by the violence in their country sought 
safety either within Syria itself or within Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt 
and Iraq. It is estimated that 6.6 million Syrians were internally displaced 
within Syria, and a further 4.8 million sought safety in the region, between 
March 2011 and the end of 2016 (www.syrianrefugees.eu 2016). Despite 
this, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) had 
received only just over half of the required aid needed to respond to the 
humanitarian needs of the displaced in mid-2016. This shortfall contributed 
to inadequate living conditions in refugee camps and cities2 in the region 
around Syria. For its part, the European Union received 1.18 million appli-
cations for asylum from Syrians between April 2011 and September 2016 
(UNHCR 2016b). Although this helps to explain the substantial increase in 
total asylum claims received by the European Union illustrated in Fig. 1.1 it 
is only a fraction of the total numbers displaced.
Indeed, as Moreno-Lax (2017a) demonstrates in her comprehensive 
analysis of EU asylum law, although there is a right to asylum enshrined 
in EU law, the EU is highly active in curtailing access to this right. This is 
achieved through a panoply of pre-border, extra-territorial and  preemptive 
2Koizumi and Hoffstadter (2015) note that many of the world’s refugees live in urban areas rather than 
dedicated camps, posing distinctive policy challenges that are only belatedly beginning to be addressed.
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measures, including offshore border checks, outsourced visa processing, 
privatised pre-boarding controls, and maritime interdiction. These ‘remote 
control’ activities effectively limit access to asylum in Europe and introduce 
a fundamental inconsistency between the lofty aspirations of the Union as 
articulated by its commitment to asylum, effective judicial protection and 
non-refoulement (that is, a commitment to not return anyone to a situation 
in which they will face persecution), and the practical barriers that asylum 
seekers face in attempting to access Europe.
Fig. 1.1 Total number of asylum applications, first instance decisions and final deci-
sions for EU-28 countries, and percentage of positive first instance and final decisions, 
2008–2017
Sources Eurostat ‘Asylum and first time asylum applicants’—annual aggregated data 
(rounded)—tps00191, ‘First instance decisions on asylum applications by type of decision—
annual aggregated data’—tps00192, and ‘Final decisions on applications by citizenship, 
age and sex Annual data (rounded)’—migr_asydcfina, all at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
data/database (accessed 21 June 2018). ‘Positive’ decisions include Geneva Convention, 
humanitarian, subsidiary and temporary protection status. Note what are referred to 
as final decisions in the graph are decisions taken by administrative or judicial bodies in 
appeal or in review and which are no longer subject to remedy. The true ‘final instance’ 
may be, according to the national legislation and administrative procedures, a decision 
of the highest national court. However, these statistics refer to what is effectively a final 
decision in the vast majority of all cases: i.e. that all normal routes of appeal have been 
exhausted
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It should also be noted in the context of the development of the preemp-
tive, extraterritorial controls that Moreno-Lax (2017b) describes, that the 
rising death toll in the Mediterranean is part of a broader and longer-term 
escalation in the number of migrants dying in and en route to Europe. The 
European Network against Nationalism, Racism, Fascism and in Support 
of Migrants and Refugees (UNITED) has kept a ‘list of deaths’ since 1993, 
which includes reported deaths that have occurred as a result of European 
border militarisation, asylum laws, poor accommodation conditions, deten-
tion, deportations and carrier sanctions. It stood at 22,394 on 19 June 2015 
(UNITED 2015), roughly two months before the publication of the pho-
tograph of the dead body of Alan Kurdi, the drowned toddler whose death 
ignited a renewed round of moral panic surrounding the “refugee crisis” in 
Europe.
Asylum determination—meaning the process of reaching a decision on 
a claim for international protection on the grounds of asylum—has long 
played an important role in European politics, but during 2015 and 2016 
it rose in prominence as the refugee issue took centre stage. Figure 1.1 
charts the number of applications, first instance decisions and final deci-
sions reached on asylum claims to Europe between 2008 and 2017, as well 
as the percentage of positive first instance and final decisions.3 First instance 
decisions refer to decisions on asylum claims usually made by a govern-
ment official in the country of asylum. Where asylum seekers receive a neg-
ative decision on their first instance claim, they have the right to appeal, in 
European countries at least, either through legal or administrative means 
depending on the country in question. The decision on appeal is usually4 
the final decision on an application and Fig. 1.1 illustrates how significant 
these final decisions are. In 2011 for example, the number of final decisions 
reached through appeal totaled over half the number of initial decisions, 
underscoring how indispensable appeal processes are to the overall deci-
sion-making system.
Figure 1.1 reveals various facets of the politics surrounding European 
asylum determination. Firstly, the volume of decisions, both first instance 
and final, increased markedly between 2008 and 2016, as indicated by the 
striped and white bars respectively. Over that period the volume of final 
3It is worth noting that because of the time it takes to administer asylum claims, many first instance 
decisions made in 2016 will have concerned applications received in 2015 or earlier, and many final 
decisions made in 2016 will have concerned applications made even earlier. The same point could be 
made for the other years shown.
4Unless there are specific matters of law that can be appealed to higher courts.
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decisions more than doubled and the volume of initial decisions more than 
quadrupled. An expansion of this scale and pace in any decision-making 
system is likely to introduce challenges in terms of staff stress and turnover, 
resources and training (see for example, Sorgoni, this volume, who describes 
an increase from ten Territorial Commissions in Italy—which examine ini-
tial asylum claims—to 45 between 2010 and 2016). Secondly however, 
this rapid acceleration in decision-making lagged behind the increase in the 
number of applications (the black bars). In 2008 there was virtual parity 
between the number of new applications received and the number of first 
instance decisions made, but for every subsequent year before 2017 this par-
ity was not restored. This led to criticism that the European asylum deter-
mination system is ill-equipped to cope with rapid increases in applications. 
It has also produced delays for applicants, which have been associated with 
mental ill health by various studies (Laban et al. 2005; Coffey et al. 2010). 
From the perspective of decision-makers, the period from 2008 to 2016 
therefore constituted something of a perfect storm: an extremely rapid 
increase in decision-making frequency coupled with a demoralising genera-
tion of backlogs, delays and associated criticisms.
The plotted lines in Fig. 1.1 reveal another interesting development 
in asylum determination in Europe: the divergence between the rate of 
success at first instance and the rate of success at the point of a final deci-
sion between 2010 and 2016. During this period the rate of success at first 
instance more than doubled, from around 25% to over 60% (illustrated 
by the solid line in Fig. 1.1). During the same period the rate of success 
on appeal declined however (the dashed line), falling below 20% in 2011 
and remaining there until 2016. There are various possible explanations for 
this development. It may be that the first instance procedure improved in 
terms of its ability to detect legally well-founded5 claims. This could help 
to explain why the appeal system was less likely to deliver positive decisions 
on asylum claims: because fewer claims that reached this stage are legally 
well founded. Alternatively however, it could mean that decision makers at 
the appeal stage simply perceived there to be an improvement in the ability 
to detect well founded claims at the initial stage, because the proportion of 
claims granted at the initial stage had risen. Appeal stage decision-makers 
might reason that if a claim has not been granted at the initial stage when 
so many other claims are, there must be something wrong with many of the 
5Although it is necessary at this point in our argument to talk about ‘well-founded claims’ the discus-
sion elsewhere in the introduction makes it clear that we perceive serious shortcomings in what the law 
asserts a well-founded claim to be.
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applications that reach them. What this reasoning misses, however, is the 
possibility that there may simply be more legally well-founded claims over-
all. If this is true, there is a risk that the increase in first instance positive 
decisions is misinterpreted by appeal stage decision makers as a signal that 
first stage procedures have improved in their ability to detect well-founded 
claims, when in fact there may have been no such improvement and there-
fore no particular reason for appeal decision makers to be more conservative.
By 2017 the system seemed to be catching up again: the total number 
of first instance decisions exceeded the number of new claims for the first 
time during the period shown in Fig. 1.1 for instance. But if criticism about 
slowness and delays was not enough, the asylum determination system has 
also drawn objections based on its inconsistent treatment of claimants over 
the same period (for example AIDA 2013). International law dictates that 
refugees can only be recognised as such if they fulfil the specific definition 
set out in Article 1(A)2 of the 1951 Geneva Convention, as modified by the 
accompanying 1967 Protocol, namely that a refugee must be someone who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country. (italics added)
Yet none of these five italicised ‘Convention reasons’ are precisely defined, 
either in the Convention itself or in the UNHCR Handbook that provides 
guidance on its application,6 nor are the key notions of ‘well-founded fear’ 
and ‘persecution’. Consequently these have all been subjected to legal inter-
pretation by a whole range of national courts across Europe and beyond, not 
always with congruent results.
What is more, both first instance and appealed decision-making across 
the countries of Europe have in practice been approached in very different 
ways reflecting the different legal cultures and political circumstances of the 
member countries. This results in uncomfortable geographical anomalies 
both in the rate of ostensibly similar refugee claims that are recognised and 
granted refugee status (or another form of positive status such as human-
itarian status, subsidiary or temporary protection status), and in the pro-
cedural approach that different countries take to asylum determination. 
6UNHCR (1979, Annexes updated 2011). Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/uk/publications/legal/3d58e13b4/hand-
book-procedures-criteria-determining-refugee-status-under-1951-convention.html [Accessed 31 July 
2016].
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The  proportion of Syrian asylum seekers who were awarded some form of 
positive status in 2015 was 97% in the EU-28 as a whole for example, but 
particular countries deviated significantly. For instance, Hungary, Italy and 
Romania each awarded some form of positive status in fewer than 60% of 
cases.7 In the same year, the recognition rate of Afghans—the second most 
common nationality of asylum claimants to Europe after Syrians8—var-
ied from 78, 83 and 96% in Austria, France and Italy to 16, 14 and 5% in 
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, respectively.9
International inconsistency is also evident procedurally. Figure 1.2 illus-
trates the variability in procedures among 17 member countries of the EU as 
well as three non-members,10 based on surveys carried out by the European 
Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) in 2017.
As can be seen from Fig. 1.2, procedural inconsistency is evident in relation 
to whether or not time limits apply to asylum claims, whether asylum seek-
ers have access to free legal assistance on appeal against a negative decision in 
practice, the use of video-conferencing and the degree to which appeals are 
suspensive11 and judicial, among other things. In fact, there is only unambigu-
ous uniformity of approach concerning three out of the 12 procedures shown.
If inconsistencies between countries are not troublesome enough, individ-
ual countries also often have more than one legal process through which asy-
lum claims can be determined, typically including both a regular process and a 
fast-track process for applications that are deemed to be easier to determine or 
less likely to be well-founded. The proliferation of different processes introduces 
complexity and inconsistencies within countries as well as across them. Greece, 
for example, has at least five proceedures including the regular procedure, border 
procedure, fast-track border procedure, accelerated procedure and Dublin pro-
cedure (Asylum Information Database 2018). The current form of the fast-track 
border procedure has been made possible by the European Union’s application of 
7Statistics refer to first instance decisions only. Eurostat table migr_asydcfsta, ‘First instance decisions 
on applications by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded)’. Available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database; published 6 June 2018 [Accessed 22 June 2018].
8Eurostat (2016). Asylum Statistics. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.
php/Asylum_statistics; published 20 April 2016 [Accessed 6 January 2017].
9Statistics refer to first instance decisions only. Countries that delivered fewer than 100 first instance 
decisions are discounted. Eurostat table migr_asydcfsta, ‘First instance decisions on applications by citi-
zenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded)’. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/
database; published 6 June 2018 [Accessed 22 June 2018].
10The 17 European Union (EU) Member States comprise Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom, and the three non-EU countries are, Serbia, Switzerland and Turkey.
11If an appeal is suspensive then a deportation will not be carried out until it is completed.
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the concept of hotspots to migration in 2015,12 which allows various European 
agencies to ‘assist’ countries that are receiving ‘disproportionate migratory pres-
sures’ in order to help them ‘fulfil their obligations under EU law’ (European 
Commission 2015; see also Giannopoulou and Gill, this volume). This innova-
tion, ‘supersedes the national in favour of hybrid, super-national governance’ via a 
process of what has been called ‘super-state’ formation (Painter et al. 2017: 259). 
In conjuction with the EU-Turkey deal that came into force in 2016 to facili-
tate the assessment of asylum claims received by the EU in Turkey, the fast-track 
border procedure has generated an ‘extremely truncated asylum procedure with 
fewer guarantees’ (Greek Council for Refugees 2017: n.p.), effectively turning 
the Greek Eastern Aegean islands that have been designated hotspots into sites of 
containment and deportation back to Turkey (Tazzioli and Garelli 2018).
Under these conditions asylum interviews undertaken by officials working 
for the European Union have been reportedly different to those conducted 
by Greek officials. Cases have been reported in practice where European 
Asylum Support Office experts lack knowledge about countries of origin, 
lack cultural sensitivity, employ closed and suggestive questions, use repet-
itive questions akin to interrogation, and conduct unnecessarily exhaustive 
interviews (Greek Council for Refugees, 2017).
The assessment of vulnerability is often crucial to which legal track is 
taken by an asylum application. In Greece for example, if an applicant is 
considered to be vulnerable then their application can be transferred out of 
the fast track border procedure. But deciding on what constitutes vulnera-
bility is itself highly variable and, in the absence of conceptual clarity, can 
depend upon who is making the assessment (AIDA 2017). The definition 
of vulnerability employed by the member countries of the European Union 
varies markedly: although most recognize being a child, being an unaccom-
panied child, being disabled, being a victim of torture and being pregnant 
as forms of vulnerability only a subset recognize being a victim of human 
trafficking, serious illness, mental disorders, lack of legal capacity and post 
traumatic stress disorder as forms of vulnerability (AIDA 2017: 16).
One of the most contested and protracted areas of controversy in relation to 
the consistency of procedures used to determine refugee status in Europe, and 
more broadly to ensure common standards for the treatment of asylum seekers 
and refugees, concerns the Common Europe Asylum System (CEAS), a series 
of directives intended to harmonise the procedures and standards of member 
countries, both at the first instance stage of their claim and during their appeal. 
12The ‘EU introduced the term “hotspots” in policy conversations addressing crime and natural disas-
ters, long before its deployment in the field of migration’ (Tazzioli and Garelli 2018: 6).
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Although hailed as a milestone on the road to integration in Europe, the sys-
tem has been roundly critiqued, largely on the basis of its widely acknowledged 
inability to ensure a harmonious approach to asylum seeker protection and 
refugee claim determination as the number of applications the EU received 
increased markedly in 2015. So prominent was the CEAS’s failure to unite 
the countries of Europe at the height of the increase in asylum claims in 2015 
that the European Union hurriedly sought to strengthen and reform it via a 
series of additional measures proposed in mid-2016, including turning a series 
of its ‘directives’ into ‘regulations’: in other words rendering them binding obli-
gations on member states rather than merely suggestions. The politics and legal 
significance of these developments is central to the issue of asylum determina-
tion in Europe, and is discussed more extensively in the next chapter.
Legal and Ethnographic Approaches to Asylum
The statistics and charts provided above hint at the extent and complexity of 
the contradictions and tensions within the European asylum system, as well as 
the extraordinary degree of discretion available both to countries and individ-
ual decision makers within the broad rules set out by the Union. There are a 
number of existing comparative studies of European asylum systems, both in 
the scholarly literature (Joly 1996; Cherubini 2014; Guild and Minderhoud 
2011); and in reports or web-sites curated by NGOs, such as the excellent 
interactive online resources made available by ECRE through their Asylum 
Information Database.13 Generally, however, these are written from a legal 
standpoint rather than the ethnographic perspective adopted in this volume.
There are important differences between the doctrinal study of law and 
the approach favoured by ethnographers (Kandel 1992), partly because, as 
Twining neatly puts it, ‘judges have a duty to decide… scientists and histori-
ans mainly conclude ’ (Twining 2006: 53, italics added). Doctrinal legal schol-
arship is fundamentally normative, both because its subject-matter is focused 
on norms, and because it generally locates itself within the legal paradigm, 
studying law in relative isolation from its social and political context (Anders 
2015: 413).14 Legal scholars are concerned with teasing out the ‘correct inter-
pretations of general legal abstractions’ in particular cases (hence the empha-
sis in legal education on the study of written judgments, at least in common 
13Available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/ [Accessed 6 January 2016].
14There are exceptions to this, such as the critical legal studies movement, and of course socio-legal 
studies constitutes a very different approach to studying the law.
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law traditions), and with ‘philosophical reflections on what and how law 
should be’ (von Benda-Beckmann 2008: 94). By contrast, the ethnographic 
approach to law is descriptive, and inherently comparative and relativistic.
The knowledge and forms of reasoning that characterise the formal legal 
systems of European states are highly esoteric, having diverged from everyday, 
lay understandings as a concomitant of professionalisation. However, while 
ethnographers do of course need to understand the legislative and admin-
istrative frameworks within which legal actors operate, these are neither their 
starting nor their finishing point. They approach lawyers or bureaucrats just 
as they would any other exotic group, trying through prolonged and detailed 
observation of their daily practices to understand their distinctive modes of 
thought and the practical actions that express these, or sometimes depart from 
them. Their analyses seek to set these concepts and practices within a broader 
socio-cultural context; unlike doctrinal academic lawyers, their ultimate analyti-
cal vantage point is located outside the legal paradigm itself. In fact the laws and 
judgments associated with hegemonic, state-sponsored legal systems are studied 
no differently from ‘folk systems’ of law underwritten by religious or traditional 
authorities (von Benda-Beckmann 2008: 97; see also Good 2015, 2017).15
As that last comment implies, ethnographies of law are almost always con-
cerned with situations of legal pluralism in one or more of the senses identified 
by Moore (2001). First, states themselves are internally complex, and their institu-
tions compete for legal authority, as with the very different migration policies and 
aspirations of the Westminster and Scottish governments in the UK.16 Second, the 
state may preside over diverse legal systems applying only to specific sub-sections 
of its population, as with the different family law systems for Hindus and Muslims 
in India (Solanki 2011); this has been labelled ‘weak legal pluralism’ (Griffiths 
1986). Third, the state legal system may be partly implemented by non-state bod-
ies (privately-run asylum detention centres, for example). Fourth, the state legal 
system vies with the legal systems of other states in supra-national arenas like the 
CEAS, or with international law vis-a-vis global institutions like UNHCR. Fifth, 
‘strong legal pluralism’ arises when the state is enmeshed with ‘non-governmen-
tal, semi-autonomous social fields which generate their own… obligatory norms to 
which they can induce or coerce compliance’ (Moore 2001: 107; italics added).
Moore’s notion of a ‘semi-autonomous social field’ has proved crucial for 
clarifying studies of legal pluralism. She does not see such fields as necessarily 
corresponding to particular social groupings. Rather, a social field is defined:
15Where formal state law is concerned ethnographers should avoid the ‘expertise-trap’ of simply accept-
ing what legal experts write about it (von Benda-Beckmann 2008: 101).
16Available at: http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/news/holyrood-and-westminster-could- 
diverge-immigration [Accessed 12 December 2016].
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by a processual characteristic, the fact that it can generate rules and coerce or 
induce compliance to them… The independent articulation of many differ-
ent social fields constitutes one of the basic characteristics of complex societies. 
(Moore 1978: 57–58)
So despite their capacities to generate rules and enforce conformity, such 
fields can only do so within limits; they are only semi-autonomous because 
they co-exist with, and are affected by, other semi-autonomous social fields 
that serve to set limits upon their own powers of enforcement. Moore gives 
the example of the garment industry in New York City, where formal legis-
lation relating directly or indirectly to garment production, such as banking 
law and labour law, operates alongside the quasi-legal regulations of non-
state bodies like trade unions and manufacturers’ associations, and less for-
mal rules growing out of ‘the interplay of the jobbers, contractors, factors, 
retailers, and skilled workers in the course of doing business with each other’ 
(Moore 1973: 728). Governments, of course, seek to regulate the social 
fields within their state boundaries—by means of legislation, for example. 
But legislation often fails to achieve its intended aims, or has unplanned or 
unexpected consequences, because it is not introduced into a vacuum, but 
into a situation that already contains complex sets of social arrangements 
and obligations, that may distort or even defeat its intended purpose.
We could make a case for how asylum exemplifies each of the sorts of 
legal pluralism Moore outlines, but her fourth and fifth senses seem par-
ticularly pertinent. Asylum clearly exemplifies legal pluralism in the fourth 
of Moore’s senses listed above, for instance. Thus, although the United 
Kingdom—for example—was an early signatory of both the 1951 United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the subsequent 
1967 Protocol that made it less narrowly focused on the specific circum-
stances prevailing after the end of the Second World War, these were not 
formally incorporated into UK law until the coming into force of the 1993 
Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act. Since then immigration and asylum 
have been subject to a growing body of UK national legislation, begin-
ning with the 1971 Immigration Act and added to at an increasingly frantic 
pace over the past two decades. They are also regulated by the Immigration 
Rules, a hugely complex body of quasi-legislative regulatory material that has 
undergone even more frequent modification.17 To a large extent, both the 
plethora of primary legislation, and the rapidly-changing Immigration Rules 
17https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-rules/immigration-rules-part-11-asylum [Accessed 31 July 
2016].
18     N. Gill and A. Good
reflect repeated attempts by the state to place yet more national restrictions 
upon the rights supposedly guaranteed by the international Convention.
Asylum also displays the characteristics of Moore’s fifth sense of legal plu-
ralism, ‘strong legal pluralism’. Asylum procedures involve complex interac-
tions between different professional actors (administrators, judges, lawyers, 
doctors and other ‘experts’, public service interpreters, and so on), regulated in 
complex ways by national and international legislation; by the rules of proce-
dure developed by or for different bureaucracies or court systems; by the eth-
ical codes of the professional bodies to which these actors belong; and by the 
unwritten conventions that have arisen through their day-to-day interactions. 
In addition, these procedures centre on would-be refugees from all over the 
world, and each asylum applicant carries with them their own ‘legal conscious-
ness’ (Merry 1990), generally not reflecting any prior experience or under-
standing of the national legal system within which their claim is being decided.
In short, European asylum systems are prime examples of ‘strong’ legal plu-
ralism in which, as Griffiths puts it, ‘the ‘law’ which is actually effective on the 
‘ground floor’ of society is the result of enormously complex and… unpre-
dictable patterns of competition, interaction, negotiation, [and] isolationism’ 
(1986: 39). It is hard to imagine how anything other than an ethnographic 
approach could hope to successfully disentangle processes of such complexity.
Approaching Asylum Determination 
Ethnographically
This present collection comes at a crucial time for Europe, when the 
European Union is consolidating its attempts to implement the Common 
European Asylum System; when mainland Europe is receiving unusually 
large numbers of people displaced by violence in the Middle East; when 
efforts to exteriorise border controls have heightened; and when the conse-
quences for migration patterns of Britain’s expected exit from the European 
Union are still almost entirely unclear. It represents the fruits of years of 
detailed in-person observations of the often obscured legal and administra-
tive processes by which asylum claims are decided. In what follows, a legal 
overview of the CEAS (Craig and Zwaan) precedes sections on the diverse 
actors involved, the means by which they communicate, and the ways in 
which they make their decisions on a daily basis.
The section on actors covers judges, first instance decision making offi-
cials, government legal representatives, and child asylum applicants. We 
employ the concept of ‘actors’ because it throws into relief two elements of 
these processes. Firstly, when considering the whole machinery of asylum 
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determination the concept of actors helps to make clear the diversity of 
people involved in making determination processes happen. Determination 
is not something that is simply conceived and executed by legal elites and 
politicians—for some people involved in the system of determination it is a 
daily practice, with all the connotations of work, routine, habits and norms 
that this entails. Secondly, the concept of actors emphasises the agency 
that each of these people can have within the process of determination. 
When examined in detail, asylum determination is not simply the appli-
cation of a set of legal rules to particular cases in a social, economic and 
cultural void. Rather, the wide range of people involved in determination 
can each, in their specific ways, also affect the course that the determina-
tion takes, for example via their emotional involvement, their bodily com-
portment, their language and their interactions. As such each of the actors 
we might identify as being involved in asylum determination is capable of 
acting upon that process, however subtly. A focus on the actors involved 
in determination therefore offers an antidote to the emphasis on either 
legal doctrine or outcome in legal studies. There are, in fact, more actors 
involved in determining an asylum appeal than might be imagined, from 
solicitors, barristers and judges, to caseworkers, clerks, security personnel, 
police, youth workers and a range of ‘experts’, not to mention applicants 
themselves. The mechanics of asylum determination therefore have their 
own sociology, involving rivalries, alliances, and competing cultures and 
discourses. Ethnographic analysis of courts, reception centres, tribunals and 
the back-offices of immigration decision making is ideally suited to exam-
ine these phenomena.
In her chapter on the challenges of judging asylum claims, for exam-
ple, Carolina Kobelinsky critically reflects on the intractable dilemmas that 
judges face, and the prominent role of personal convictions and emotions 
in determining life or death cases, drawing on 14 months of ethnographic 
fieldwork conducted at the French Court of Asylum. Massimiliano Spotti’s 
analysis of credibility assessments in the Belgian determination system exam-
ines how a second crucial set of actors—the immigration officials charged 
with making decisions about asylum claims at first instance—valorise 
particular forms of factual truth that often bear little relation to the lived 
histories of asylum seekers, but which can nevertheless lead to life-threat-
ening forms of identity misrecognition. John Campbell’s work on present-
ing officers who put forward the legal case against asylum seekers on behalf 
of the British Home Office during tribunal appeal hearings offers a rare 
glimpse of the fractious and obscured sociology of a world that is made 
insular by the adversarial nature of the British legal process. And Chrisa 
Giannopoulou and Nick Gill take advantage of the street-level perspective 
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offered by an ethnographic approach to report on the tensions between vul-
nerability and agency in the context of asylum seeking children in the Greek 
system of reception centres and camps.
The second section of the book turns to the pivotal issue of commu-
nication during the asylum determination process. Communication in 
asylum cases is frequently inadequate to the task. In particular, the ten-
sion between the global processes that produce asylum seekers and refu-
gees and the national and local contexts in which understanding about 
them circulates, produces the ideal conditions for mutual incomprehen-
sion and misunderstanding (Blommaert 2009). Language in asylum claim 
determination
is dominated by frames that refer to static and timeless (i.e., uniform and 
national) orders of things. So while asylum seekers belong to a truly global 
scale of events and processes, the treatment of their applications is brought 
down to a rigidly national scale, a very modernist response to postmodern real-
ities. This creates many problems—problems of justice, to name just one cat-
egory. It also lays bare some of the threads of the fabric of globalization—the 
paradox between transnational processes and national frames for addressing 
them, for instance. (Blommaert 2009: 415)
These tensions give rise to both constraints over the means of expression and 
instances of misinterpretation and miscommunication. When communica-
tive mistakes are made in this arena people’s lives are put at stake, so it is 
difficult to think of an area in which clear and effective communication is 
more important. The diversity of languages involved in processes of asylum 
claim determination, however, render the area extremely challenging from 
the perspective of the practical necessity for good quality, reliable and profes-
sional interpretaters and translators. With all these difficulties in mind, the 
chapters in this section underscore the unerring serendipity and unreliability 
of communication even in grave contexts such as asylum determination.
Julia Dahlvik’s analysis of the Austrian Federal Asylum Office, for 
instance, argues that the role and power of interpreters in the administrative 
asylum procedure is so extensive that renewed attention should be given to 
professional ethics governing their conduct. Relatedly, Robert Gibb’s analy-
sis of asylum interviews and appeals in France settles upon the metaphor of 
‘power struggle’ to capture the ways in which communication is contested 
within these settings. Matilde Skov Danstrøm and Zachary Whyte corrob-
orate the gravity of communication in the Danish asylum system, by not 
only highlighting the pivotal role of narrative in asylum appeal processes but 
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also the way in which the inability to ‘perform’ narratives convincingly can 
endanger just asylum decisions. Finally, Jessica Hambly examines the work 
of judges in asylum appeals in the British context from a fresh perspective. 
Rather than concentrating on their (mis)use of discretion, she examines the 
non-legal forms of interaction and relationships that judges form with those 
around them in the course of their work. This approach understands judg-
ing as not only a legal act of decision making, but a complex social pro-
cess of communication and competition between actors, organisations, and 
institutions.
The third section focuses squarely on the issue of decision making on 
asylum claims by judges and administrative officials. In all the chapters in 
this section, the subjectivities of the legal process of decision making are in 
evidence. For example, drawing on analysis and observation of 230 Italian 
asylum appeal decisions, as well as interviews with judges, Barbara Sorgoni 
focuses on the critical concept of credibility, arguing that internal consist-
ency of asylum claims is given too much weight in the deliberations of legal 
officials in the absence of alternative criteria. Similarly, Tone Liodden finds 
that Norwegian asylum decision makers tend to turn towards ‘equal treat-
ment’ of claims in the absence of evidence and other criteria upon which 
to base their decisions, with important implications for the kinds of jus-
tice practised in asylum determination. For Laura Affolter, Jonathan Miaz 
and Ephraim Poertner working in the Swiss context, the key issue is how 
self-understandings of their official roles inform what asylum system deci-
sion makers do and how they understand and enact ‘justice’. And Stephanie 
Schneider, in her work on the German asylum system, underscores the 
dilemmas facing system bureaucrats in an environment that overtly pursues 
productivity but delegates the responsibility for quality onto individuals.
Overall, the contributors offer a series of contextually rich accounts that 
move beyond doctrinal law to expose the gaps and variances between policy 
and legislation as they are written down and as they are practised. Not only 
do they provide empirical depth and innovative insights regarding particular 
countries but they are also adeptly theorised. What is more, through their 
proximity and juxtaposition, the contributions offer the reader a compara-
tive perspective covering ten European countries.
Although the contributors write variously from sociological, anthropo-
logical, geographical and linguistic disciplinary perspectives, they are united 
in adopting an ethnographically-based methodological approach. Through 
this rich empirical and multi-disciplinary lens, they capture the current, 
contested reality of claiming asylum in Europe, laying bare the confusion, 
improvisation, inconsistency, complexity and uncertainty inherent to the 
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process. Their fusion of empirical insights, ethnographic approaches, theo-
retical reflections and legal subject matter offers a series of windows onto 
a complex and obfuscated area of law that is nevertheless central to foun-
dational debates about the viability of the European Union and the moral 
obligations that Western developed states owe to outsiders seeking protec-
tion. Most fundamentally, this book addresses the need to find out how, pre-
cisely, claims for international protection under asylum law from some of 
the most marginalised people in the world are being handled.
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